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Efficient incentives with social preferences

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  • Daske, Thomas
  • March, Christoph

Abstract

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Daske, Thomas & March, Christoph, 2022. "Efficient incentives with social preferences," BERG Working Paper Series 180, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bamber:180
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mechanism design; social preferences; Bayesian implementation; participation constraints; participation stimulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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