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Information Design and Full Implementation in Nonatomic Games

Author

Listed:
  • Frederic Koessler

    (GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales)

  • Marco Scarsini

    (Luiss University, Department of Economics and Finance, Roma)

  • Tristan Tomala

    (HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales)

Abstract

This paper studies the implementation of Bayes correlated equilibria in symmetric Bayesian games with nonatomic players, using direct information structures and obedient strategies. The main results demonstrate full implementation in a class of games with negative payoff externalities, such as congestion and Cournot games. Specifically, if the game admits a strictly concave potential in every state, then for every Bayes correlated equilibrium outcome with finite support and rational action distributions, there exists a direct information structure that implements this outcome under all equilibria. When the potential is weakly concave, we show that all equilibria implement the same expected total payoff. Additionally, all Bayes correlated equilibria, including those with infinite support or irrational action distributions, are approximately implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2026. "Information Design and Full Implementation in Nonatomic Games," Working Papers hal-05611088, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-05611088
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6313975
    as

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