IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v232y2026ics0022053126000098.html

Sequential network design

Author

Listed:
  • Sun, Yang
  • Zhao, Wei
  • Zhou, Junjie

Abstract

We examine dynamic network formation from a centralized perspective, where a forward-looking social planner constructs one new link between previously unconnected nodes in each period. The planner derives utility from the discounted sum of benefits generated throughout the formation process. Assuming the planner’s instantaneous utility depends monotonically on the aggregate number of walks of various lengths within the network, we derive several key results. First, it is always optimal to form a nested split graph at each stage, regardless of the discount function. Second, when the planner is sufficiently myopic, the optimal strategy uniquely generates a quasi-complete graph in each period. This finding provides a micro-foundation for quasi-complete graphs as natural outcomes of greedy network formation processes. Finally, we extend our analysis to weighted networks, demonstrating the robustness of our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Sun, Yang & Zhao, Wei & Zhou, Junjie, 2026. "Sequential network design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:232:y:2026:i:c:s0022053126000098
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053126000098
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:232:y:2026:i:c:s0022053126000098. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.