A Mechanism Design for a Solution to the Tragedy of Commons
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Other versions of this item:
- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008. "Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(4), pages 253-270, February.
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Cited by:
- Naoki Yoshihara & Akira Yamada, 2019.
"Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 113-134, June.
- Naoki Yoshihara & Akira Yamada, 2018. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies with Unequal Skills: A Characterization," Working Papers SDES-2018-18, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Dec 2018.
- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2007.
"Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 85-106, September.
- Yamada, Akira & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2006. "Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economics with unequal labor skill," Discussion Paper Series a475, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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