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Punctuality - A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium

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  • Basu, Kaushik

    (Department of Economics)

  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

Abstract

A people's culture, norms and habits are important determinants not just of the quality of social life but of economic progress and growth. In this paper we take the view that while the importance of culture is undeniable, the innateness of culture is not. We work here with a single example and demonstrate how a human trait which is widely believed to be cultural is at the same time a matter of choice. The example that we shall work with concerns punctuality. We show that punctuality may be simply an equilibrium response of individuals to what they expect others to do. The same society can get caught in a punctual equilibrium or a non-punctual equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002. "Punctuality - A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 582, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0582
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Punctuality; Coordination Games;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D29 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Other
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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