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Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration

Author

Listed:
  • Tito Cordella

    (International Monetary Fund, U.S.A.)

  • Manjira Datta

    (Arizona State University, U.S.A.)

Abstract

In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount). ""S'il y avait 3, 4, ...n producteurs en concurrence [...] la valeur de p, qui en rÈsulte, diminuerait indÈfiniment par l'accroissement indÈfini du nombre n"," A. A. Cournot (1838, p. 63). Copyright 2002 by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Resarch Association

Suggested Citation

  • Tito Cordella & Manjira Datta, 2002. "Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 137-153, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:1:p:137-153
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    Cited by:

    1. Manjira Datta & Leonard J. Mirman, 2000. "Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 44-59, February.
    2. Eleni Dalla & Christos Karpetis & Erotokritos Varelas, 2014. "Monetary Policy Implications on Banking Conduct and Bank Clients’ Behavior," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(4), pages 427-440, December.
    3. Julien, Ludovic A., 2011. "Unemployment equilibrium and economic policy in mixed markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1931-1940, July.
    4. Gerhard Sorger, 1996. "Imperfect competition and capital accumulation: the role of price normalization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 63(3), pages 279-302, October.
    5. Polemarchakis, Herakles M. & Ray, Indrajit, 2006. "Sunspots, correlation and competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 174-184, July.
    6. Datta, Manjira, 1997. "Externalities and Price Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(3), pages 587-603, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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