Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration
In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., it moves towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., it moves away from the Walrasian amount). ""S'il y avait 3, 4, ...n producteurs en concurrence [...] la valeur de p, qui en rÈsulte, diminuerait indÈfiniment par l'accroissement indÈfini du nombre n"," A. A. Cournot (1838, p. 63). Copyright 2002 by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Resarch Association
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