Dissipation in Rent-seeking Contests with Entry Costs
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Dissipation in Rent-seeking Contests with Entry Costs," Game Theory and Information 0211001, EconWPA.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2007.
"Strategy in contests: an introduction
[Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2004. "Mixed sharing rules," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 196, Econometric Society.
More about this item
KeywordsNon-cooperative games; rent-seeking; rent dissipation; entry costs;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2002/11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin E. Diedrich). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dekeeuk.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .