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A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries

Author

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  • Yoav Wachsman

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Abstract

Coastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishing firms that operate in their Exclusive Economic Zone. We develop a game-theoretical model in which a fishery owner maximizes the revenue that it collects from firms that operate in its EEZ by charging them a fishing fee. We find that if the number of firms is exogenous and finite the owner is likely to select a fee that is higher than socially optimal. On the other hand, if the owner can choose the number of firms it does not place any restrictions on entry to the EEZ and selects a fee that maximizes net return.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoav Wachsman, 2002. "A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries," Working Papers 200216, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:200216
    as

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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_02-16.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Renewable Resources; Fisheries Management; Coastal Nations; Fishing Fee;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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