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A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries


  • Yoav Wachsman

    () (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)


Coastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishing firms that operate in their Exclusive Economic Zone. We develop a game-theoretical model in which a fishery owner maximizes the revenue that it collects from firms that operate in its EEZ by charging them a fishing fee. We find that if the number of firms is exogenous and finite the owner is likely to select a fee that is higher than socially optimal. On the other hand, if the owner can choose the number of firms it does not place any restrictions on entry to the EEZ and selects a fee that maximizes net return.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoav Wachsman, 2002. "A Model of Fishing Conflicts in Foreign Fisheries," Working Papers 200216, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:200216

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kamien, Morton & Levhari, David & Mirman, Leonard J., 1985. "Dynamic model of fishing: The relationship to conjectural variations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 308-321, December.
    2. Erwin Bulte & Henk Folmer & Wim Heijman, 1995. "Open access, common property and scarcity rent in fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(4), pages 309-320, December.
    3. Berck, Peter & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1984. "An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 489-506, March.
    4. Dockner, Engelbert & Feichtinger, Gustav & Mehlmann, Alexander, 1989. "Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-20, January.
    5. Charles, Anthony T., 1986. "Coastal state fishery development : Foreign fleets and optimal investment dynamics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 331-358, December.
    6. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
    7. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July.
    8. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:04:y:2002:i:01:n:s0219198902000549 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Rosenman, Robert E., 1986. "The optimal tax for maximum economic yield: Fishery regulation under rational expectations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 348-362, December.
    10. Campbell, H. F., 1996. "Prospects for an international tuna resource owners' cartel," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 419-427, September.
    11. Clark, Colin W. & Munro, Gordon R., 1975. "The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 92-106, December.
    12. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
    13. Gordon R. Munro, 1982. "Fisheries, Extended Jurisdiction and the Economics of Common Property Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(3), pages 405-425, August.
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    More about this item


    Renewable Resources; Fisheries Management; Coastal Nations; Fishing Fee;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery


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