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Coordination on formal vs. de facto standards: a dynamic approach

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  • Belleflamme, Paul

Abstract

Formal standards arise out of deliberations of standards-writing organizations, while de facto standards result from unfettered market processes. Therefore, the formers are of a higher quality and legitimacy, but are slower to develop than the latters. To address this trade-off, we analyze a dynamic game where two players choose between one evolving formal standard and one mature de facto standard. The outcome of the game relies on the coordination mechanism used by the players, on the relative value they attach to successful coordination, and on the formal standard's performance at the end of the game.
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Suggested Citation

  • Belleflamme, Paul, 2002. "Coordination on formal vs. de facto standards: a dynamic approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 153-176, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:153-176
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    Cited by:

    1. Hong Jiang & Shukuan Zhao & Zhi Li & Yong Chen, 2016. "Interaction between technology standardization and technology development: a coupling effect study," Information Technology and Management, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-243, September.
    2. repec:eee:respol:v:46:y:2017:i:8:p:1370-1386 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Blind, Knut & Mangelsdorf, Axel, 2016. "Motives to standardize: Empirical evidence from Germany," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 48, pages 13-24.
    4. Gauch, Stephan & Blind, Knut, 2015. "Technological convergence and the absorptive capacity of standardisation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 236-249.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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