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A simple model of coalitional bidding

Author

Listed:
  • Rajiv Vohra

    () (Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912, USA)

  • In-Koo Cho

    () (Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA)

  • Kevin Jewell

    () (Cornerstone Research, Boston, Massachusetts 02115, USA)

Abstract

We analyze a model of coalitional bidding in which coalitions form endogenously and compete with each other. Since the nature of this competition influences the way in which agents organize themselves into coalitions, our main aim is to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and the resulting bids. We do so in a simple model in which the seller may have good reason to allow joint bidding. In particular, we study a model in which the agents are budget constrained, and are allowed to form coalitions to pool their finances before engaging in the first price auction. We show that if the budget constraint is very severe, the equilibrium coalition structure consists of two coalitions, one slightly larger than the other; interestingly, it is not the grand coalition. This equilibrium coalition structure is one which yields (approximately) the maximum expected revenue. Thus the seller can induce the optimal (revenue maximizing) degree of cooperation among budget constrained buyers simply by permitting them to collude.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajiv Vohra & In-Koo Cho & Kevin Jewell, 2002. "A simple model of coalitional bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(3), pages 435-457.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:3:p:435-457
    Note: Received: June 25, 1999; revised version: November 13, 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2009. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 105-124, January.
    2. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
    3. Konishi, Hideo & Quint, Thomas & Wako, Jun, 2001. "On the Shapley-Scarf economy: the case of multiple types of indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-15, February.
    4. Atsushi Iimi, 2007. "Aid and competition in procurement auctions: a case of highway projects," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(7), pages 997-1015.
    5. Kai Konrad, 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
    6. Sumit Joshi & Poorvi Vora, 2013. "Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 657-696, August.
    7. Iimi, Atsushi, 2004. "(Anti-)Competitive effect of joint bidding: evidence from ODA procurement auctions," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 416-439, September.
    8. repec:eee:gamebe:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:67-82 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mukherjee, Conan, 2017. "Bidding rings: A bargaining approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 67-82.
    10. Md. Sayed Iftekhar & John G. Tisdell, 2016. "An Agent Based Analysis of Combinatorial Bidding for Spatially Targeted Multi-Objective Environmental Programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 537-558, August.
    11. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2009. "Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from ODA infrastructure procurement," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4853, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Coalitions; Collusion; Joint bidding.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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