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Joint Bidding, Governance And Public Procurement Costs:A Case Of Road Projects


  • Antonio Estache
  • Atsushi Iimi


To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices. Copyright © 2009 The Authors Journal compilation © CIRIEC 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2009. "Joint Bidding, Governance And Public Procurement Costs:A Case Of Road Projects ," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(3), pages 393-429, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:80:y:2009:i:3:p:393-429

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Gathon, H. -J. & Pestieau, P., 1995. "Decomposing efficiency into its managerial and its regulatory components: The case of European railways," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 500-507, February.
    2. Bernadette Biatour & Mathieu Lefebvre & Sergio Pereleman & Pierre Pestieau, 2005. "Faut-il un ou plusieurs indicateurs d'exclusion sociale?," CREPP Working Papers 0503, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
    3. van Doorslaer, Eddy & Wagstaff, Adam & Bleichrodt, Han & Calonge, Samuel & Gerdtham, Ulf-G. & Gerfin, Michael & Geurts, Jose & Gross, Lorna & Hakkinen, Unto & Leu, Robert E., 1997. "Income-related inequalities in health: some international comparisons," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 93-112, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:taf:jdevst:v:53:y:2017:i:4:p:465-480 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Antonio Estache & Atsushi Iimi, 2010. "Bidder Asymmetry in Infrastructure Procurement: Are There any Fringe Bidders?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 163-187, March.
    3. Collier,Paul & Kirchberger,Martina & Söderbom,Måns, 2015. "The cost of road infrastructure in low and middle income countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7408, The World Bank.
    4. Claudia N. Berg & Uwe Deichmann & Yishen Liu & Harris Selod, 2017. "Transport Policies and Development," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(4), pages 465-480, April.

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