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Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey

Author

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  • Bedri Kamil Onur Tas
  • Rasim Ozcan
  • Ilke Onur

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Bedri Kamil Onur Tas & Rasim Ozcan & Ilke Onur, 2008. "Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey," Working Papers 0814, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tob:wpaper:0814
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    File URL: http://ikt.web.etu.edu.tr/RePEc/pdf/0814.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2005. "Stochastic synergies in sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 183-201, April.
    2. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2008. "Procurement efficiency for infrastructure development and financial needs reassessed," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4662, The World Bank.
    3. Paarsch, Harry J., 1992. "Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
    4. Brannman, Lance & Klein, J Douglass & Weiss, Leonard W, 1987. "The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(1), pages 24-32, February.
    5. Elberfeld, Walter & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1999. "A dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 513-525, May.
    6. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85.
    7. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2009. "The effect of information on the bidding and survival of entrants in procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 56-72, February.
    8. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    9. Atsushi Iimi, 2006. "Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(2), pages 109-128, March.
    10. James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, 2002. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," NBER Technical Working Papers 0284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Philip A. Haile, 2001. "Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 399-427, June.
    12. Menezes, Flavio M., 2008. "An Introduction to Auction Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199275991.
    13. Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008. "Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 327-334, March.
    14. Tong Li & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Timber Sale Auctions with Random Reserve Prices," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 189-200, February.
    15. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2000. "Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1927, Econometric Society.
    16. Srabana Gupta, 2002. "Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(1), pages 13-25, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zornitsa Kutlina-Dimitrova & Csilla Lakatos, 2016. "Determinants of direct cross-border public procurement in EU Member States," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 152(3), pages 501-528, August.
    2. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas & Ahu Genis-Gruber, 2008. "E-Procurement Savings and Competition Effect: Analysis of Cultural Differences Through a Unified Model," Working Papers 0815, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
    3. Zhongmin Wang & Minbo Xu, 2016. "Empirical Evidence on Competition and Revenue in an All-Pay Contest," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 429-448, November.
    4. Martin Schmidt, 2015. "Price Determination in Public Procurement: A Game Theory Approach," European Financial and Accounting Journal, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2015(1).
    5. Selcuk, Cemil, 2013. "Motivated sellers and predation in the housing market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 203-214.
    6. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2017. "Collusion Detection in Public Procurement with Limited Information," Working Papers 1127, Economic Research Forum, revised 08 Oct 2017.
    7. Kutlina-Dimitrova, Zornitsa, 2017. "Can we put a price on extending the scope of the GPA? First quantitative assessment," DG TRADE Chief Economist Notes 2017-1, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission.
    8. Ari, Izzet & Sari, Ramazan, 2015. "The role of feed-in tariffs in emission mitigation: Turkish case," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 768-775.
    9. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2014. "How to Achieve Efficiency in Public Procurement Auctions," EcoMod2014 6728, EcoMod.
    10. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2015. "How to Achieve Efficiency in Public Procurement Auctions," Working Papers 919, Economic Research Forum, revised Jun 2015.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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