Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions
The objectives of this study are to investigate the institutional speci¯cs of sequential cattle auctions and their role as determinants of prices. Institutional speci¯cs are the order of sale according to quality, a secret reserve price, bidders' multi-unit demand and di®erent types of bidders. Prices decline and bidders with a higher demand pay on average lower prices. The estimation results show that declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the secret reserve price. The results further show that bidders take the strategic e®ect of sequential auctions and multi-unit demand into account.
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