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A note on Brandl and Brandt’s axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium

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  • Schroeder, Andreas

Abstract

The axiomatic requirements in Brandl and Brandt (2024) make it possible to define solution concepts that do not select the set of all Nash equilibria as claimed. More precisely, it is possible to construct solution concepts that fulfill the axiomatic requirements, but in certain games no equilibrium is selected at all, as a simple example shows.

Suggested Citation

  • Schroeder, Andreas, 2024. "A note on Brandl and Brandt’s axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium," MPRA Paper 123069, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:123069
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix, 2024. "An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
    2. Schade, Christian & Schroeder, Andreas & Krause, Kai Oliver, 2010. "Coordination after gains and losses: Is prospect theory’s value function predictive for games?," Structural Change in Agriculture/Strukturwandel im Agrarsektor (SiAg) Working Papers 59524, Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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