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Pareto-Improvements, Welfare Trade-Offs and the Taxation of Couples

Author

Listed:
  • Felix Bierbrauer

    (University of Cologne)

  • Pierre Boyer

    (Ecole Polytechnique)

  • Andreas Peichl

    (LMU Munich)

  • Daniel Weishaar

    (LMU Munich)

Abstract

We develop a theory of tax reforms for a setting with multi-dimensional heterogeneity amongst taxpayers and multiple economic decisions that are all subject to fixed and variable costs. The theorems in this paper provide a complete characterization of the conditions under which Pareto- or welfare-improving tax reforms exist. We focus on one application, the taxation of couples, and present a detailed analysis of the behavioral responses to taxation in this setting. Squaring the theorems with this analysis yields sufficient statistics for the existence of Pareto- or welfare-improving tax reforms. In the empirical part, we apply them to US data. Our findings include the following: Tax rates on secondary earnings are inefficiently high when secondary earnings are close to primary earnings. Also, reducing the tax system’s degree of jointness is not Pareto-improving. Whether it raises welfare depends on a trade-off between poverty alleviation and gender balance.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre Boyer & Andreas Peichl & Daniel Weishaar, 2024. "Pareto-Improvements, Welfare Trade-Offs and the Taxation of Couples," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 518, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:518
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Felix Bierbrauer & Pierre Boyer & Andreas Peichl & Daniel Weishaar, 2023. "The Taxation of Couples," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 405, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    2. Eissa, Nada & Hoynes, Hilary Williamson, 2004. "Taxes and the labor market participation of married couples: the earned income tax credit," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1931-1958, August.
    3. Emmanuel Saez & Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, 2012. "The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 3-50, March.
    4. Olivier Bargain & Kristian Orsini & Andreas Peichl, 2014. "Comparing Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe and the United States: New Results," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 49(3), pages 723-838.
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    Cited by:

    1. Advani, Arun & Burgherr, David & Summers, Andy, "undated". "Taxation and Migration by the Super-Rich," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 630, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    2. Nicolo Ceneri & Giuseppe Lopomo & Alessandro Villa & Nicolas Werquin, 2026. "Taxing Entrepreneurs and Workers: A Linear Optimization Approach for Multidimensional Screening," Working Paper Series WP 2026-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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