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Groups versus individuals, partial lying, and social image concern in a dice-rolling experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Yoshitaka Okano

    (Kansai University)

  • Eiji Goto

    (Nichinan Gakuen Junior High School)

Abstract

This study compares the lying behavior of groups that consist of paired friends to that of individuals in a dice-rolling experiment. Both groups and individuals exhibit strong evidence of lying, but partial lying (not lying to the maximum extent possible) is more pronounced under group decisions. Furthermore, we estimate the preference parameter(s) of existing models for lying aversion. Groups are more sensitive than individuals to social image concerns of not being perceived as liars, and have a lower cost of lying than do individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoshitaka Okano & Eiji Goto, 2024. "Groups versus individuals, partial lying, and social image concern in a dice-rolling experiment," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 301-331, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jecrev:v:75:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s42973-023-00139-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00139-0
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lying; Group decisions; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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