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The buffer role of emotions in international conflict: theoretical evidence supporting for patriotic education

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  • Zhengping Zhang

    (Shandong University)

Abstract

This research uses a behavioural game-theoretic paradigm to study the role of emotions in forming and preventing international conflict. We find that when two countries’ strengths mismatch their resource, one of the two sides is motivated to initiate a conflict. However, national-dignity-related emotions can reduce this motivation. This is because countries with emotional populace are more likely to retaliate, thus becoming less susceptible to provocation. Meanwhile, these countries’ leaders are more cautious in provoking other nations due to the fear of losing face from failed provocations. Consequently, long-term patriotic education can reduce international conflict by fostering these emotions.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhengping Zhang, 2024. "The buffer role of emotions in international conflict: theoretical evidence supporting for patriotic education," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 487-503, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:25:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-024-00320-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-024-00320-0
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International conflict; Emotions; Bargaining; Patriotic education; Behavioural game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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