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Democracy Corrupted: Apex Corruption and the Erosion of Democratic Values

Author

Listed:
  • Rivera, Eduardo

    (MIT)

  • Seira, Enrique

    (MSU)

  • Jha, Saumitra

    (Stanford U)

Abstract

Democratic values are eroding just as citizens perceive increasing corruption, with numerous cases implicating the highest-level politicians. Could perceived increases in apex corruption be weakening democracy? We first present event study analyses of more than 170 high-profile corruption scandals involving some of the most prominent politicians in 17 Latin American countries. We show that in the aftermath of such apex corruption scandals, support for democracy falls by 0.07ð ‘ ð ‘‘, support for authoritarianism rises by 11% and violent protests rise by 70%. We complement these results with a field experiment in Mexico. Randomized exposure to footage of apex corruption scandals, particularly implicating politicians known for their anticorruption platforms, decreases individuals’ support for democracy by 0.15ð ‘ ð ‘‘, willingness to trust politicians and neighbors in incentivized games by 18% and 11%, volunteering as election observers by 45%, and actual voter turnout by about 5ð ‘ ð ‘ , while raising stealing from local mayors by 4%. The undermining of democratic values produces latent effects that even cumulate four months later. Seeking solutions, priming national identity proved an unsuccessful antidote, but providing exposure to national stock index funds holds some promise.

Suggested Citation

  • Rivera, Eduardo & Seira, Enrique & Jha, Saumitra, 2024. "Democracy Corrupted: Apex Corruption and the Erosion of Democratic Values," Research Papers 4166, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:4166
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    File URL: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/democracy-corrupted-apex-corruption-erosion-democratic-values
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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