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Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game

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Listed:
  • Michalis Drouvelis
  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
  • Yuta Shimodaira

Abstract

Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, proposers can give part of their endowment to responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, responders can destroy the proposers’ endowment. Although these additional options lead responders to retaliate more severely, they do not significantly influence proposers’ behavior. Only when proposers can give and responders can concurrently destroy proposers’ endowments do proposers take significantly less from the responders.

Suggested Citation

  • Michalis Drouvelis & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Yuta Shimodaira, 2024. "Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game," ISER Discussion Paper 1262r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised May 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1262r
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    File URL: https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1262R.pdf
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