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Reciprocity is Different: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game Between Japanese Domestic and International Students

Author

Listed:
  • Tetsuya Kawamura

    (Tezukayama University)

  • Yusuke Osaki

    (Waseda University)

  • Go Ohtani

    (Osaka Sangyo University)

  • Ryuji Saito

    (Osaka Sangyo University)

Abstract

This study examined the difference in Japanese people’s recognition of Japanese and foreigners through trust game experiments with Japanese and international university students. Participants mentioned their birthplaces at the beginning of the game. Other demographic characteristics, such as gender and faculty, were also declared and used as control variables. All international students were assigned as trustors and Japanese students were randomly assigned as trustors or trustees. The experimental results revealed that: First, the level of trustworthiness did not significantly differ between Japanese and foreign international students. Second, Japanese students have significantly higher unconditional reciprocity for international students than for Japanese students. Third, the level of conditional reciprocity is not significantly different. This result suggests that being reserved may show the closed-mindedness of Japanese people toward foreigners.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuya Kawamura & Yusuke Osaki & Go Ohtani & Ryuji Saito, 2023. "Reciprocity is Different: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game Between Japanese Domestic and International Students," The Review of Socionetwork Strategies, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 167-178, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:trosos:v:17:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s12626-023-00143-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s12626-023-00143-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International students; Laboratory experiment; Reciprocity; Strategy method; Trust game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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