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Public Policy and Individual Labor Market Discrimination: An Artefactual Field Experiment in China

  • Uwe Dulleck
  • Jonas Fooken
  • Yumei He

We study discrimination based on the hukou system, a policy segregating migrants and locals in urban China. We hired household aids as participants in our artefactual field experiment and use a gift exchange game to study labor market discrimination. We fi nd that social discrimination based on hukou status also implies individual level discrimination. To identify whether discrimination is statistical or taste-based we introduce the wage promising game, a gift exchange game with a cheap talk wage promise. We find that discrimination is taste-based: Status is exogenous for our participants, migrants and locals behave similarly and discrimination increases when reasons for statistical discrimination are removed.

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File URL: http://external-apps.qut.edu.au/business/documents/QuBEWorkingPapers/2012/WP002.pdf
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Paper provided by QUT Business School in its series QuBE Working Papers with number 002.

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Date of creation: 28 Nov 2012
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Handle: RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp002
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.qut.edu.au/research/research-projects/queensland-behavioural-economics-group-qube

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