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A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks

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  • Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz

Abstract

We consider an object reallocation problem within a specific class of trade restrictions. An agent can only receive the object of someone else connected to him, which is referred to as feasibility. We introduce a Network Augmented Top Trading Cycles (NTTC) mechanism. Our main result shows that a mechanism is NTTC if and only if it is feasible, individually rational, constrained efficient, and strategy-proof.

Suggested Citation

  • Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz, 2023. "A characterization of Top Trading Cycles under trading networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:233:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523004093
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111383
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Julien Combe & Umut Mert Dur & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1050, Boston College Department of Economics.
    2. Umut Mert Dur & M. Utku Ünver, 2019. "Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1156-1177.
    3. Ekici, Özgün, 2024. "Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    4. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ekici, Özgün & Sethuraman, Jay, 2024. "Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: A short proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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