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Characterizing TTC via endowments-swapping-proofness and truncation-proofness

Author

Listed:
  • Coreno, Jacob
  • Feng, Di

Abstract

In the object reallocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974), Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018) showed that Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is the unique rule satisfying individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and endowments-swapping-proofness. We show that the uniqueness remains true if strategy-proofness is weakened to truncation-proofness.

Suggested Citation

  • Coreno, Jacob & Feng, Di, 2025. "Characterizing TTC via endowments-swapping-proofness and truncation-proofness," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524006438
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112159
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.
    2. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    3. Jacob Coreno & Di Feng, 2024. "Axioms for Top Trading Cycles in Multi-Object Reallocation," Papers 2404.04822, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
    4. Ekici, Özgün, 2024. "Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    5. Yajing Chen & Zhenhua Jiao & Chenfeng Zhang & Luosai Zhang, 2021. "The Machiavellian frontier of top trading cycles," Papers 2106.14456, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    6. Ma, Jinpeng, 1994. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 75-83.
    7. Ekici, Özgün & Sethuraman, Jay, 2024. "Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: A short proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xinquan Hu & Jun Zhang, 2025. "Local unanimity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Papers 2511.22027, arXiv.org.
    2. Chen, Yajing & Jiao, Zhenhua & Zhang, Chenfeng & Zhang, Luosai, 2025. "Some new characterizations of top trading cycles," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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