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The order of move in a conversational war of attrition

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  • Decker, Christian

Abstract

This paper investigates computationally when and how the order of move matters in a Conversational War of Attrition (Meyer-ter-Vehn et al., 2018). Switching the first mover flips the debate’s outcome for certain type-realizations and triggers two potentially opposing forces on jurors’ ex-ante expected costs. In the finite-horizon version of the game, a last-proposal advantage prevails if the jurors’ bias dominates their impatience, and a first-proposal advantage prevails if impatience dominates bias. In the infinite-horizon version, there is an unambiguous first-proposal advantage. These mechanisms are reminiscent of the Rubinstein (1982) sequential bargaining game.

Suggested Citation

  • Decker, Christian, 2023. "The order of move in a conversational war of attrition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:228:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002069
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111181
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Lones Smith & Katalin Bognar, 2018. "A Conversational War of Attrition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(3), pages 1897-1935.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debate; Conversational war of attrition; Order of move; Rubinstein bargaining; First-mover advantage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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