IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v155y2023ics0014292123000727.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transmission and use of information in network games

Author

Listed:
  • Currarini, Sergio
  • Feri, Francesco
  • Hartig, Bjoern
  • Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.

Abstract

We design an experiment to study how agents share and make use of information in networks. Agents receive payoff-relevant signals automatically shared with neighbours. We compare the use of information in different network structures, considering games in which strategies are substitute, complement, and orthogonal. To study the incentives to share information across games, we also allow subjects to modify the network before playing the game. We find behavioural deviations from the theoretical prediction in the use of information, which depend on the network structure, the position in the network, and the strategic nature of the game. There is also a bias towards oversharing information, which is related to risk aversion and the position in the network.

Suggested Citation

  • Currarini, Sergio & Feri, Francesco & Hartig, Bjoern & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2023. "Transmission and use of information in network games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:155:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000727
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292123000727
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks; Experiment; Information sharing; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Behavioural biases;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:155:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000727. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.