Battle of the Sexes: Non-Cooperative Games in the Theory of the Family
We look at private-provision-of-public goods games. These games share an assumption that family members non-cooperatively use their resources either to acquire a private good or a family-specific good. What exactly constitutes the "private good" and the "public good" will be seen to vary from model to model. The next section suggests that the type of non-cooperative model presented earlier can be used to reformulate the Nash bargaining theory of the household.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway|
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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