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Equilibres Monetaires du Jeu Strategique de Marche dans le Modele a Generations Imbriquees


  • Bigot de Morogues, F.


Ce papier presente un modele d'equilibre general de concurrence imparfaite dans une economie d'echange avec generations imbriquees. La concurrence imparfaite se traduit par la regle de fixation du prix des jeux strategiques du marche a la Shapley-shubik. Apres avoir presente le modele et defini l'equilibre, les conditions d'existance d'un equilibre stationnaire, symetrique et non autarcique sont donnees dans le cas de plusieurs biens. On peut souligner la simplicite de la demonstration.

Suggested Citation

  • Bigot de Morogues, F., 1997. "Equilibres Monetaires du Jeu Strategique de Marche dans le Modele a Generations Imbriquees," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 97a18, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97a18

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    18. Alicia H. Munnell, 1992. "Policy Watch: Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 189-198, Fall.
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    20. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas & Schwartz, Amy Ellen, 1995. "Infrastructure in a structural model of economic growth," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 131-151, April.
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    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games


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