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Ignorance as a Commitment Device

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Sasaki

    (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

In a strategic environment, when a player's information acquisition is observable to others, it may strictly decrease the player's resulting equilibrium payoff even if information acquisition itself is costless. This phenomenon has previously been known by a number of examples. This paper shows that such a phenomenon can indeed arise under a broad class of conditions, not being confined to carefully selected specific examples. Excess information is almost always hurtful. This finding implies that public provision of information can strictly hurt the set of economic agents to be informed. To protect the interest of a certain economic group, it is almost always desirable to impose appropriate limitations on the official disclosure of information to the group.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Sasaki, 1997. "Ignorance as a Commitment Device," Discussion Papers 97-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9708
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    information acquisition; value of information; state space; disclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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