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Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

Author

Listed:
  • Van Kolpin

    (Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA)

  • Larry Singell Jr.

    (Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, USA)

Abstract

The neoclassical model of labor market discrimination assumes the presence of either prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of worker productivity, or monopsony power. We show that when market agents control asymmetric information, strategic behavior can induce discriminatory hiring practices even when these market features are absent. Moreover, strategic interaction many distort public policies to the point of harming the segments of the work force they were designed to support.

Suggested Citation

  • Van Kolpin & Larry Singell Jr., 1997. "Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 175-184.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:1:p:175-184
    Note: Received: January 3, 1996 revised version April 29, 1996
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Hao & Zhao, Chunming & Yu, Wence, 2017. "Continued export trade, screening-matching and gender discrimination in employment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 88-100.
    2. Singell, Larry D. & Tang, Hui-Hsuan, 2013. "Pomp and circumstance: University presidents and the role of human capital in determining who leads U.S. research institutions," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 219-233.
    3. Robert S. Chase, 2001. "Labor Market Discrimination During Post-Communist Transition: A Monopsony Approach to the Status of Latvia's Russian Minority," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 381, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    4. Tilman Klumpp & Xuejuan Su, 2013. "A theory of perceived discrimination," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 153-180, May.
    5. Monks, James, 2000. "The returns to individual and college characteristics: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 279-289, June.
    6. Larry D. Singell & John M. McDowell & James P. Ziliak, 1999. "Cracks in the Glass Ceiling: Gender and Promotion in the Economics Profession," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 392-396, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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