Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian
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- Wooders, John, 1994. "Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian," UC3M Working papers. Economics 2981, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Gale, Douglas, 1987.
"Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining,"
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Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October.
- Douglas Gale, 2010. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 621, David K. Levine.
- Gehrig, Thomas, 1993. "Intermediation in Search Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 97-120, Spring.
- Yavas, Abdullah, 1994. "Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(3), pages 406-429, July.
- Schmidt, David R & Aliprantis, Charalambos D, 1993. "Price Dynamics in Overlapping Generations Environments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(3), pages 541-563, July.
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- Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
- Peter A. Diamond, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 217-227.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nadia Burani & Clara Ponsati, 2011.
"Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 91-120, June.
- Nadia Burani & Clara Ponsati, 2002. "Countervailing Power? Collusion in Markets with Decentralized Trade," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 540.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Nadia Burani, 2008. "Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(2), pages 75-117, June.
- Michael Sattinger, 2003. "Price Dynamics and the Market for Access to Trading Partners," Discussion Papers 03-10, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsIntermediation; bid; ask; matching; Walrasian equilibrium;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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