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Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian

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  • Wooders, John

Abstract

We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian auctioneer setting bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. In the model agents trade either through the intermediary or privately. Buyers (sellers) choosing to trade through the intermediary potentially trade immediately at the ask (bid) price, but sacrifice the spread as potential gains. Agents trading privately capture all of the gains to trade, but risk costly delay in finding a partner. We show that when the cost of delay is small, the intermediary sets bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. As the cost of delay vanishes, the equilibrium bid and ask prices converge to the Walrasian equilibrium prices. If the possibility of trading through the intermediary is removed, and therefore all trade takes place in the private trading market, then prices are not close to Walrasian equilibrium prices even as the cost of delay vanishes.

Suggested Citation

  • Wooders, John, 1994. "Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian," UC3M Working papers. Economics 2981, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:2981
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Gehrig, Thomas, 1993. "Intermediation in Search Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 97-120, Spring.
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    6. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October.
    7. Schmidt, David R & Aliprantis, Charalambos D, 1993. "Price Dynamics in Overlapping Generations Environments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(3), pages 541-563, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Michael Sattinger, 2003. "Price Dynamics and the Market for Access to Trading Partners," Discussion Papers 03-10, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    3. Johanna Kangas & Markku Ollikainen, 2023. "Behavioural and Welfare Analysis of an Intermediary in Biodiversity Offset Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 84(4), pages 1127-1154, April.
    4. Nadia Burani & Clara Ponsati, 2011. "Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 91-120, June.
    5. Nadia Burani, 2008. "Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(2), pages 75-117, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intermediation;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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