Endogenously determined price rigidities (*)
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- Khan, Abhimanyu & Peeters, Ronald, 2015.
"Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 28-36.
- Khan, A. & Peeters, R.J.A.P., 2013. "Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market," Research Memorandum 022, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Konovalov, Alexander, 2009.
"Constrained suboptimality when prices are non-competitive,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 43-58, January.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Konovalov, A., 2000. "Constrained Suboptimality When Prices are Non-Competitive," Discussion Paper 2000-114, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Konovalov Alexander, 2000. "Constrained Suboptimality when Prices Are Non-competitive," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Konovalov Alexander, 2002. "Constrained Suboptimality when Prices Are Non-competitive," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Vasil'ev, Valery & Wiesmeth, Hans, 2008. "Equilibrium in a mixed economy of arrow-debreu type," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 132-147, January.
- Tuinstra, Jan, 2000. "The emergence of political business cycles in a two-sector general equilibrium model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 509-534, September.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
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