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Corruption within a Cooperative Society

Author

Listed:
  • Kosfeld, Michael

    (Department of Economcis, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna)

Abstract

In this paper we take up a model of Okada (1996) to describe the possibility of collective cooperation in a n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game by means of institutional arrangements. In addition, we introduce the possibility to corrupt the institutional authority by paying him some positive transfer in order not to be punished in case of defection. It is shown that there exists a maximal number of corrupting and defecting agents such that the organization is still formed and the rest of the population cooperates.

Suggested Citation

  • Kosfeld, Michael, 1997. "Corruption within a Cooperative Society," Economics Series 48, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:48
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    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/995
    File Function: First version, 1997
    Download Restriction: no
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Justin Buffat & Julien Senn, 2017. "Corruption, norm enforcement and cooperation," ECON - Working Papers 260, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2018.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Cooperation; Prisoner's Dilemma; Organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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