On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions
The paper reports on a series of experiments in asymmetric First-and Second-Price auctions with private-independent values. The data reveals that although subjects did realize the strategic implications of the asymmetric setting, a significant overbidding pattern was found in First-Price auctions and caused the regjection of the suggested revenue ranking.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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