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Are Women Less Effective Leaders Than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games

Author

Listed:
  • Lea Heursen
  • Eva Ranehill
  • Roberto A. Weber

Abstract

We study whether one reason behind female underrepresentation in leadership is that female leaders are less effective at coordinating action by followers. Two experiments using coordination games investigate whether female leaders are less successful than males in persuading followers to coordinate on efficient equilibria. Group performance hinges on higher-order beliefs about the leader’s capacity to convince followers to pursue desired actions, making beliefs that women are less effective leaders potentially self-confirming. We find no evidence that such bias impacts actual leadership performance, identifying a precisely-estimated null effect. We show that this absence of an effect is surprising given experts’ priors.

Suggested Citation

  • Lea Heursen & Eva Ranehill & Roberto A. Weber, 2020. "Are Women Less Effective Leaders Than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 8713, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8713
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8713.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Haan & Lea Heursen & Jule Specht & Bruno Veltri & Georg Weizsäcker, 2023. "Public Appeals and Collective Crisis Mitigation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 478, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    gender; coordination games; leadership; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General

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