Game Theory, Institutions and the Schelling-Bacharach Principle: Toward an Empirical Social Ontology
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bacharach, Michael, 1999. "Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 117-147, June.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
- Bacharach, Michael & Stahl, Dale O., 2000. "Variable-Frame Level-n Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 220-246, August.
- Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April.
- Hindriks, Frank & Guala, Francesco, 2015. "Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(03), pages 459-480, September.
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- Smit, J. P. & Buekens, Filip & du Plessis, Stan, 2011. "What Is Money? An Alternative To Searle'S Institutional Facts," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(01), pages 1-22, March.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shaun Hargreaves Heap & David Rojo Arjona & Robert Sugden, 2012. "A Popperian test of level-k theory," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 12-06, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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- Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, November.
More about this item
KeywordsSocial ontology; epistemic game theory; institutions; theory of Mind; Schelling-Bacharach principle;
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2016-06-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2016-06-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2016-06-18 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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