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Game Theory, Institutions and the Schelling-Bacharach Principle: Toward an Empirical Social Ontology

Listed author(s):
  • Cyril Hédoin

    (University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, France)

  • Lauren Larrouy

    (University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France
    GREDEG CNRS)

This article defends a methodological and theoretical claim according to which the combination of epistemic game theory with the recent developments in the so-called “theory of mind” is able to provide an empirically grounded and theoretically consistent perspective on the mechanisms through which institutions determine the individuals’ beliefs and choices. This move toward an empirical social ontology is captured through what we call the Schelling-Bacharach principle in game theory. According to it, game-theoretic analysis of coordination and cooperation should study how the players are actually reasoning in different game situations.

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File URL: http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2016-21.pdf
File Function: First version, 2016
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis in its series GREDEG Working Papers with number 2016-21.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2016
Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-21
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  1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
  2. Bacharach, Michael & Stahl, Dale O., 2000. "Variable-Frame Level-n Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 220-246, August.
  3. Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April.
  4. Hindriks, Frank & Guala, Francesco, 2015. "Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(03), pages 459-480, September.
  5. Schotter,Andrew, 2008. "The Economic Theory of Social Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521067133, December.
  6. Smit, J. P. & Buekens, Filip & du Plessis, Stan, 2011. "What Is Money? An Alternative To Searle'S Institutional Facts," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(01), pages 1-22, March.
  7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Shaun Hargreaves Heap & David Rojo Arjona & Robert Sugden, 2012. "A Popperian test of level-k theory," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 12-06, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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