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Recall and private monitoring

Listed author(s):
  • Phelan, Christopher
  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej

For a general class of games with private monitoring we show for any finite state strategy (or automaton strategy) with Di states for players i∈{1,…,N}, if there exists a number of periods t such that it is possible on-path to reach any joint state from any joint state in t periods, the strategy is a strict correlated equilibrium only if each player's strategy is a function only of what the player observes in the last Di−1 periods.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615000329
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 90 (2015)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 162-170

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:90:y:2015:i:c:p:162-170
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.010
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 311-340, September.
  2. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 189-228, January.
  3. Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.
  4. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 84-105, January.
  5. Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2009. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1773-1814.
  6. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
  7. Christopher Phelan & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2012. "Beliefs and Private Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1637-1660.
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