Beliefs and Private Monitoring
This paper develops new recursive, set based methods for studying repeated games with private monitoring. For any finite-state strategy profile, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for whether there exists a distribution over initial states such that the strategy, together with this distribution, form a correlated sequential equilibrium (CSE). Also, for any given correlation device for determining initial states (including degenerate cases where players' initial states are common knowledge), we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the correlation device and strategy to be a CSE, or in the case of a degenerate correlation device, for the strategy to be a sequential equilibrium. We also consider several applications. In these, we show that the methods are computationally feasible, and how to construct and verify equilibria in a secret price-setting game. Copyright , Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 79 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |