Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions
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- Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997. "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Discussion Paper 1997-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1997. "Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,28, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Güth, Werner, 1998. "Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,5, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Possajennikov, A., 1999. "On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences," Discussion Paper 1999-56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
More about this item
KeywordsIndirect evolution; strategic delgation; commitment; duopoly markets; agency theory;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1998-08-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-1998-08-31 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-MIC-1998-08-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-1998-08-31 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-1998-08-31 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TID-1998-08-31 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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