Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play
The main objects here are noncooperative games in which all externalities occur via a one-dimensional variable. So-called mean-value iterates are used to approach Nash equilibrium. The proposed schemes generalize many received methods, and can be interpreted as learning taking place during repeated play. An important feature is that no player need to be fully informed about the game structure. Particular examples include Cournot oligopolies and some nonatomic market games.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gjerstad, Steven, 1996.
"The Rate of Convergence of Continuous Fictitious Play,"
Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 161-77, January.
- Steven Gjerstad, 1995. "The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 161-178.
- Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 1990. "Iterative computation of cournot equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 61-75, March.
- Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 427-33, July.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"The Theory of Learning in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
624, David K. Levine.
- Smale, Steve, 1980. "The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1617-34, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:22:y:1998:i:6:p:833-848. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.