Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria using Experience Weighted Attraction Learning: emergence of heterogeneous mixed equilibria
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003.
"Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1249-1278.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," Scholarly Articles 3160493, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000098, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," NBER Working Papers 9528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2004.
"Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players,"
FEUNL Working Paper Series
wp466, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," Game Theory and Information 0412009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carl Chiarella & Giulia Iori, 2002. "A simulation analysis of the microstructure of double auction markets," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(5), pages 346-353.
- Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-137, February.
- Cabral, Luis M. B., 1988. "Asymmetric equilibria in symmetric games with many players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 205-208.
- Guilherme Carmona, 2003.
"Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players,"
Game Theory and Information
0311004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp442, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, March.
- Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(3), pages 427-433, July.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-07-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-DES-2017-07-02 (Economic Design)
- NEP-EXP-2017-07-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2017-07-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2017-07-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2017-07-02 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1706.09763. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (arXiv administrators). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.