Report NEP-DES-2017-07-02This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.
The following items were announced in this report:
- Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2017. "Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: Unanimity vs Monotonicity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01539444, HAL.
- Joosung Lee, 2017. "Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms," Working Papers 2017.27, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Sareh Vosooghi, 2017. "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 2017.28, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017. "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Working Papers 2017.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Robin Nicole & Peter Sollich, 2017. "Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria using Experience Weighted Attraction Learning: emergence of heterogeneous mixed equilibria," Papers 1706.09763, arXiv.org.
- Dan Usher, 2017. "Interpreting ArrowÃ¢Â€Â™s Impossibility Theorem," Working Paper 1384, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Guha, Brishti, 2017. "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper 79876, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2017. "Strategic vote trading under complete information," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 03-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Margherita Negri, 2017. "Good Politicians' Distorted Incentives," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 201713, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.