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Report NEP-DES-2017-07-02
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2017, "Aggregation of Bayesian preferences: Unanimity vs Monotonicity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-01539444, May.
- Joosung Lee, 2017, "Mechanisms with Referrals: VCG Mechanisms and Multilevel Mechanisms," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.27, Jun.
- Sareh Vosooghi, 2017, "Information Design In Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.28, Jun.
- Thomas Demuynck & Jean-Jacques Herings & Riccardo D. Saulle & Christian Seel, 2017, "The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.26, Jun.
- Robin Nicole & Peter Sollich, 2017, "Dynamical selection of Nash equilibria using Experience Weighted Attraction Learning: emergence of heterogeneous mixed equilibria," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1706.09763, Jun.
- Dan Usher, 2017, "Interpreting Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1384, Aug.
- Guha, Brishti, 2017, "Should Jurors Deliberate?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 79876, Jun.
- Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2017, "Strategic vote trading under complete information," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics, University of Cyprus Department of Economics, number 03-2017, Jun.
- Item repec:san:wpecon:1713 is not listed on IDEAS anymore