Averaged Predictions and the Learning of Equilibrium Play
The main objects here are noncooperative games in which all externalities occur via a one-dimensional variable. So-called mean-value iterates are used to approach Nash equilibrium. The proposed schemes generalize many received methods, and can be interpreted as learning taking place during repeated play. An important feature is that no player need to be fully informed about the game structure. Particular examples include Cournot oligopolies and some nonatomic market games.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway|
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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- Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 1990. "Iterative computation of cournot equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 61-75, March.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(3), pages 427-433, July.
- Gjerstad, Steven, 1996.
"The Rate of Convergence of Continuous Fictitious Play,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 161-177, January.
- Steven Gjerstad, 1995. "The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 161-178.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
- Smale, Steve, 1980. "The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1617-1634, November. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)