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Endogenously Asynchronous Entries Into an Uncertain Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Hirokawa, M
  • Sasaki, D.

Abstract

In the presence of demand uncertainty, a priori identical firms may voluntarily choose asynchronous timing of entries. We formulate a duopoly model where two firms compete during many marketing periods. To enter the market, each firm is required to make a long-term supply contract with retailers, which stipulates that the firm must supply a constant quantity each period. The state of demand is ex ante uncertain, and becomes observable a period after at least one firm's entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Hirokawa, M & Sasaki, D., 1998. "Endogenously Asynchronous Entries Into an Uncertain Industry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 608, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:608
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    Keywords

    DEMAND ; DUOPOLIES;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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