IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cvs/starer/97-26.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the Design of Optimal Organizations Using Tournaments: An Experimental Examination

Author

Listed:
  • Orrison, Alannah
  • Schotter, Andrew
  • Weigelt, Keith

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Orrison, Alannah & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1997. "On the Design of Optimal Organizations Using Tournaments: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers 97-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:97-26
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9382/RR97-26.PDF
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christian Grund & Niels Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008. "The Dispersion of Employees' Wage Increases and Firm Performance," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(4), pages 485-501, July.
    2. Grund, Christian, 2002. "The Wage Policy of Firms – Comparative Evidence for the U.S. and Germany from Personnel Data," IZA Discussion Papers 605, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2003. "An experimental study on tournament design," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 443-464, August.
    4. Christian Grund & Niels Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008. "The Dispersion of Employees' Wage Increases and Firm Performance," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 61(4), pages 485-501, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tournaments; economic experiments; incentives;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:97-26. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Stubing). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aenyuus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.