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Marriage, Housework and Fairness

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  • Widmalm, Frida

    (Department of Economics)

Abstract

I explore the effects of a preference for fairness in the division of housework between two spouses in two different models of household time allocation. Both in the model with agreeing spouses and the model with noncooperative spouses, such a preference has an equalising effect on the division of labour between the partners. In the noncooperative setting, the wife gets better off and the husband worse off in terms of private consumption. I also argue that both the allocation process and the degree of fairness consideration matter for policy outcomes and discuss three policy measures in relation to these two factors.

Suggested Citation

  • Widmalm, Frida, 1998. "Marriage, Housework and Fairness," Working Paper Series 1998:22, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1998_022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fairness; housework; unpaid work; household production; household time allocation;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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