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Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Players Games


  • Figuieres, C.
  • Garderes, P.
  • Rychen, F.


In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.

Suggested Citation

  • Figuieres, C. & Garderes, P. & Rychen, F., 1998. "Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Players Games," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a03, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98a03

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities


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