IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Oligopsonistic Cats and Dogs


  • Gerda Dewit

    () (National University of Ireland Maynooth)

  • Dermot Leahy

    () (University College Dublin)


We study the strategic investment behaviour of oligopsonistic rivals in the labour market. Under wage competition, firms play "puppy dog" with productivityaugmenting investment and "fat cat" with supply-enhancing investment. Under employment competition, investing strategically always involves playing "top dog".

Suggested Citation

  • Gerda Dewit & Dermot Leahy, 2005. "Oligopsonistic Cats and Dogs," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n1590905, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
  • Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n1590905

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
    2. Bhaskar, V. & To, Ted, 2003. "Oligopsony and the distribution of wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 371-399, April.
    3. Manning, Alan, 2004. "Monopsony and the efficiency of labour market interventions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 145-163, April.
    4. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    5. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    6. Francois, Joseph F & Wooton, Ian, 2001. "Trade in International Transport Services: The Role of Competition," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 249-261, May.
    7. Alan Manning, 2006. "A Generalised Model of Monopsony," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 84-100, January.
    8. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics,in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455 Elsevier.
    9. Hwang, Hae-shin & Mortensen, Dale T & Reed, W Robert, 1998. "Hedonic Wages and Labor Market Search," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(4), pages 815-847, October.
    10. Bhaskar, V & To, Ted, 1999. "Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 190-203, April.
    11. Lapham, Beverly & Ware, Roger, 1994. "Markov puppy dogs and related animals," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 569-593, December.
    12. Jun, Byoung & Vives, Xavier, 2004. "Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 249-281, June.
    13. Alan Manning & Ted To, 2002. "Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 155-174, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Tabasso, D, 2009. "Temporary Contracts and Monopsony Power in the UK Labour Market," Economics Discussion Papers 8938, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    2. Coccorese, Paolo, 2012. "Banks as ‘fat cats’: Branching and price decisions in a two-stage model of competition," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 64(5), pages 338-363.

    More about this item


    Oligopsony; Strategic behaviour; Productivity-augmenting investment;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n1590905. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: () or (Candi Patterson) or (Katrina Wingle). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.