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Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games
[Hétérogénéité dans une classe à deux joueurs]

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Figuieres

    () (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement)

  • Frédéric Rychen

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Figuieres & Frédéric Rychen, 2011. "Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games [Hétérogénéité dans une classe à deux joueurs]," Post-Print hal-02643026, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02643026
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02643026
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nick Hanley & Henk Folmer (ed.), 1998. "Game Theory and the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1083.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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